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Abstract: After the discovery of quantum mechanics by Heisenberg and Schrö-
dinger in 1925, Einstein raised again and again objections to this theory. Obvi-
ously, he had the impression that (a) quantum mechanics does not adequately
grasp reality, that it is (b) based on probabilistic laws of nature and that it is
(c) for this reason incomplete. Einstein must have obtained this impression from
many presentations of quantum mechanics in the ﬁrst decade after its discovery.
 However, technical refutations of Einstein's objections were not possible when
these arguments were put forward, since the necessary formal tools were not yet
available at this time. Instead, the advocates of quantum mechanics tried to
disprove Einstein merely by intuitive and less rigorous arguments.  In the light
of current physics we ﬁnd that the objections (a) and (b) are irrelevant since, in
accordance with Einstein's intentions, quantum mechanics does refer to reality
and is not based on probabilistic laws. Only the incompleteness argument is in-
correct. However, for technical reasons a convincing refutation of this objection
only became possible thirty years after its formulation and ten years after Ein-
stein's death.
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1 Introduction:
Einstein's Contributions to Quantum Physics
Without any doubt, Einstein made crucial contributions to quantum theory. In
1905, the year when also his paper on special relativity appeared, Einstein pub-
lished an article with the title Über einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des
Lichtes betreﬀenden heuristischen Gesichtspunkt (Einstein 1905). In order to give
a better explanation for light electrical phenomena, Einstein in this publication
developed the idea that the light hitherto described by Maxwell's theory consists
of discrete energy quanta, the light quanta. In a further paper Zur Theorie der
Peter Mittelstaedt: Einstein's Objections against Quantum Mechanics
Lichterzeugung und Lichtabsorption that appeared in 1906 (Einstein 1906), these
considerations were continued and related to Planck's radiation formula. In the
beginning, however, the signiﬁcance of the light quantum hypothesis was just
noted by few physicists. This presumably contributed to the fact that Einstein
was only in 1921 awarded the Nobel prize for this discovery.
In the subsequent years, Einstein predominantly dealt with the theory of relativity
and apparently he did not follow up the light quantum problem. Only when in
1924 the young Indian physicist S. N. Bose sent a manuscript titled Planck's Law
and the Light Hypothesis to him, with the request to review and forward it to a
journal, Einstein's interest woke up again. He was obviously very impressed by
Bose's article, translated it, and submitted it for publication to the Zeitschrift für
Physik (Bose 1924). Immediately afterwards, in the course of two weeks, Einstein
wrote an own manuscript titled Quantentheorie des einatomigen Gases and sent
it to the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Einstein 1924). A second
article with the same title followed shortly afterwards. Bose's and Einstein's
articles developed the statistics of an ideal quantum gas, which today we call Bose-
Einstein statistics (for many historical details see Stachel 2002, in particular pp.
427444 and 519538). In spite of his own signiﬁcant contributions to the theory
of light quanta, Einstein's attitude toward quantum theory drastically changed
when in 1925 Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Bohr, and others developed the quantum
mechanics proper. From the very beginning Einstein stood in critical opposition
to this new theory. During the subsequent years up to his death in 1955, again
and again he put forward important objections against quantum mechanics. 
Here, these objections will be investigated in more detail.
2 Does Quantum Mechanics Grasp Reality?  The Prin-
ciple of Reality
Einstein believed that quantum mechanics does not grasp reality adequately, if
it does at all. With this assessment, Einstein either became a victim of the sup-
posed positivism of quantum mechanics1 or of one of the many misunderstandable
remarks of Bohr's.2 In his review of Schilpp's volume on Einstein (Schilpp 1949),
C. F. von Weizsäcker remarked already in 1950 (von Weizsäcker 1960, p. 208):
Einstein's tragical error seems to be that he thinks this (i.e., to
remove the concept of reality from physics, P.M.) would happen in
quantum mechanics.
We will see that not only Einstein was caught by this error.
In the ﬁrst years after the formulation of quantum mechanics, the discussions
between Bohr and Einstein made it clear that according to quantum mechan-
1For example, in Heisenberg (1927), p. 197, the remark following remark is found: Die
Physik soll nur den Zusammenhang der Wahrnehmungen formal beschreiben.
2See e.g. the Como lecture, Bohr (1928), p. 46: Nach der Quantentheorie kommt eben wegen
der nicht zu vernachlässigenden Wechselwirkung mit dem Messmittel bei jeder Beobachtung ein
ganz neues unkontrollierbares Element hinzu.
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ics, in general no direct experimental access to a physical quantity (observable)
is possible and that in any measurement it is unavoidable to disturb the object
system.3 In order to exclude all objections of this type, some years later Ein-
stein formulated a criterion of reality, the so-called principle of reality (Einstein/
Podolsky/Rosen 1935, 777, emphasis deleted):
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding
to this physical quantity.
This formulation of this criterion alone caused a storm of protest among the
discoverers of quantum physics: Pauli, Heisenberg and especially Niels Bohr.
But let us ﬁrst see what exactly Einstein's criterion expresses in the context of
quantum mechanics.
In the discussion of the 1930s, many physicists emphasized that the measurement
process gives rise to an uncontrollable disturbance of the object, due to which
no exact predictions are possible. A measurement process connects a quantum
system S to a measuring device M by a interaction U that exists for a short
period of time. This interaction must be appropriate for the measurement of
the observable A under consideration (which in the simplest case is discrete and
non-degenerate). In order to guarantee this, at ﬁrst an unspeciﬁed process of
interaction (which corresponds to a scattering process) must obey to some pos-
tulates. Here, primarily the calibration postulate is important.
If the preparation ϕ of the system S is already an eigenstate of the
observable A = ΣAiP [ϕAi ], that is, if ϕ = ϕAn for a certain n, then the
measurement of A must give rise to the result A with certainty. If it
is a repeatable measurement, this means that the system S after the
measurement is in the state ϕAn and objectively has the value An of
the quantity A.
This requirement may easily expressed in formal terms. If Φ is the prepara-
tion state of the pointer of the measuring device and Z = ΣZiP [(Φi] a discrete,
non-degenerate pointer observable, then the application of a unitary interaction
operator UA (which is appropriate for the measurement of A) to the tensor prod-
uct Ψ(S +M) = ϕ⊗ Φ of the preparation states has the eﬀect
UA(ϕ⊗ Φ) = ϕAn ⊗ Φn.
According to this, the pointer eigenvalue Zn of an appropriate pointer function
f(Zi) belonging to the state Φn provides the wanted value An = f(Zn) of the
measurement. Here we do always presuppose that we deal with a repeatable
measurement, in which the object only is subject to the inﬂuences indispensable
for a measurement, but not to other disturbances. For the calibrating measure-
ment considered here this means that the state ϕ = ϕAn of S does not change at
all.
3Later, Bohr reported about the so-called Bohr-Einstein debate in his contribution to Schilpp
(1949).
Physics and Philosophy  2006  Id: 001 3
Peter Mittelstaedt: Einstein's Objections against Quantum Mechanics
Figure 1: Calibrating Measurement of the Observable A = ΣAiP [ϕAi ].
The calibration postulate refers to situations in which the object system is pre-
pared in an eigenstate ϕAn of the respective observable A. In all other cases, in
which the preparation ϕ of the object is no eigenstate of A, after the interaction
the state Ψ′(S+M) = UAΨ′(S+M) is a superposition of product states ϕAi ⊗Φi
which does not allow to predict the measurement outcome, i.e., the state Φn of
the pointer and with it the pointer value, with certainty.
Hence, for any repeatable unitary measurement that obeys this calibration pos-
tulate the following relation holds. If it is possible to predict for a system S the
value An of an observable A = ΣAiP [ϕAi ] with certainty without changing the
system in any way, then the state Ψ′(S+M) of the joint system S+M after the
repeatable measurement must be a product state
Ψ′ = UAΨ = ϕAn ⊗ Φn.
Then, the object system is in state ϕAn and the pointer M in state Φn. From
the pointer value Zn it can be concluded with certainty that after measurement
the object system S objectively posses the value An = f(Zn). But, from the
explicit form of the state Ψ′ of S + M after measurement also follows that the
state Ψ′(S +M) of S +M before measurement has the shape
Ψ = U−1A Ψ
′ = ϕAn ⊗ Φ
and that already before the measurement the object system S is in state ϕAn and
has the value An. Hence, the property E(An) := P [(ϕAn ] exists as a real property
of S.
Up to diﬀerent linguistic presentations, however, this relation is exactly Einstein's
reality criterion or principle. It is a suﬃcient criterion for the objective reality of
a property E(AN), which directly follows from the calibration postulate. There-
fore, one may say that Einstein's reality criterion does indeed hold in quantum
theory. It indicates all the situations in which in spite of all quantum mechanical
restrictions make it possible to speak about the objective reality of the properties
of a system.
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The way in which the quantum physicists felt disturbed by Einstein's reality
criterion is hard to understand. As an example, we may cite Niels Bohr's reaction
of 1935 (Bohr 1935, p. 65):
[...] that the procedure of measurements has an essential inﬂuence
on the conditions on which the very deﬁnition of the physical quan-
tities in question rests. Since these conditions must be considered as
an inherent element of any phenomenon to which the term `physical
reality' can be unambiguously applied, the conclusion of the above
mentioned authors would not appear to be justiﬁed.
Similar remarks of many physicists may be found in the 1930s. Obviously many
of them really believed what Einstein was afraid of, namely that the concept of
reality does no longer apply in quantum mechanics. An objectively reasonable
reaction that might have consisted in an incorporation of this criterion into quan-
tum mechanics is not found anywhere. Indeed, formally such an incorporation
became only possible much later. However, these reactions also show that an ob-
jectively quite correct observation was rejected without any substantial reasons.
3 Is Quantum Mechanics a Probabilistic Theory?  God
Does Not Play Dice!
For Einstein, a particularly annoying feature of quantum mechanics was its sup-
posed probabilistic nature. Since in quantum mechanics it is usually impossible
to predict individual events, the (classical) predictions for the outcomes of indi-
vidual measurements are replaced by statistical propositions. The probabilities
or expectation values of measurement results can be calculated in well-known
ways according to the laws of quantum mechanics. Since quantum mechanics
does in general not determine the individual events but only a large collective of
many events, Pauli talks of statistical causality in this context, meaning that in
quantum mechanics the large collectives still show lawlike behavior (Pauli 1948).
Einstein did not so much query the occurrence of probabilities as rather the fact
that the quantum mechanical probabilities underly certain laws. In an unpub-
lished draft of a statement to Max Born's contribution to the volume Albert Ein-
stein: PhilosopherScientist edited by Schilpp in 1949 (Schilpp 1949), Einstein
wrote:
This article is a moving hymn to a beloved friend [...] one who will
not believe that God plays dice. In one point, however, Born does
me an injustice, namely, when he thinks that I have been untrue to
myself in this respect since certain I often availed myself of statistical
methods. In truth, I never believed that the foundations of physics
could consist of laws of statistical nature. (quoted from Stachel 2002,
p. 390).
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In a letter of 1942, Einstein made his discontent with the statistical laws of
quantum mechanics more precise, indicating that for him it would be much more
plausible if the world were completely chaotic and lawless (letter to F. Reiche,
1942; quoted from Stachel 2002, p. 390):
I still do not believe that the Lord God plays dice. If he had wanted
to do this, then he would have done it thoroughly and not stopped
with a plan for gambling [...]. Then we wouldn't have to search for
laws at all.
Let us see due to which assertions of quantum mechanics these objections are
and whether they actually apply to quantum mechanics. The use of probabilities
in quantum mechanics and the loss of an individual causal laws were described
by Pauli in terms of statistical causality, as mentioned. This means the facts
essential on quantum mechanics that the outcome of a measurement at an indi-
vidual object system may be completely undetermined, whereas the behavior of
a large number of objects is nevertheless determined by strict statistical law. In
a letter to Fierz (26. 09. 1949) Pauli wrote (Pauli 1985b, p. 709):
Jenes statistische Verhalten der vielen gleichen Einzelsysteme, die
keinerlei Kontakt miteinander haben (fensterlose Monaden), ohne
doch anderseits kausal determiniert zu sein, ist ja in der Quanten-
mechanik als letzte, nicht weiter reduzierbare Tatsache aufgefasst.
Consequently, Pauli does not oﬀer any rational explanation for this irreducible
fact. Instead, he attempts to make this non-explainable phenomenon compre-
hensible in terms of an analogy to the pre-established harmony of Leibniz' win-
dowless monads. For a large number of measurements of a non-objective property
at many identically prepared systems, the outcome of each individual measure-
ment is completely undetermined. And even though the many individual systems
do not have any contact with each other, together they satisfy a strict statistical
law. It is surely unsatisfactory to understand this situation as an irreducible
fact, as Pauli put it.
Much later, in 1983, J. A. Wheeler was searching for an explanation of this
at ﬁrst look quite strange behavior, introducing the expression law without law
(Wheeler 1983). Even though the individual systems do not obey any recognizable
law, Wheeler suspected that for a collective of many systems only due to the large
number of many individual systems emerges a strict statistical law. Wheeler
illustrates his suspicion for an interference experiment with photons, without
giving any explanation in terms of a theoretical or physical deduction. Instead, he
remarks that the relation between the individuals without law and the collective
determined by laws is established by an unspeciﬁed grand regulating principle.
[...] you will be left as much in the dark as I am, what the grand
regulating principle is that produces the laws.
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Figure 2: Beam Splitter Experiment in a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer.
However, it is indeed possible to bring light into the dark Wheeler is talking about
here and to ﬁnd a satisfying explanation for a quantum mechanical law without
law. In the following, I will brieﬂy explain this, employing the interference
experiment mentioned by Wheeler.
Let us consider a beam-splitter experiment in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
(Fig. 2). A semi-transparent mirror BS1 splits the state ϕ of the incoming photon
into two orthogonal components ϕ(B) and ϕ(¬B) which correspond to the two
possible paths B and ¬B. Then, by means of two totally reﬂecting mirrors
M1 and M2 the two partial beams are led to a second semi-transparent mirror
BS2. There, they are recombined with a phase shift δ inserted to the partial
beam ¬B. Therefore, ϕ = 1/√2(ϕ(B) + eiδϕ(¬B)). By means of placing two
detectors D1 and D2 in two diﬀerent positions it is now possible to measure
diﬀerent observables.
If the two detectors are in the positions DB1 and DB2 , then one measures which
path (B or ¬B) the photon has taken. But if the detectors are in the positionsDA1
and DA2 , then one measures an interference pattern, i.e., intensities that depend
on the phase δ.
In this experiment the object system S is prepared in the state ϕ. Here, two
incommensurable observables exist which are not objective in the preparation
state ϕ, namely the path observable B with eigenstates ϕ(B) and ϕ(¬B) and the
interference observable A with eigenstates ϕ(A) and ϕ(¬A). The probabilities to
ﬁnd B in DB2 or ¬B in DB1 are:
p(ϕ,B) = p(ϕ,¬B) = 1/2.
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The probabilities to ﬁnd A in DA2 or ¬A in DA1 are:
p(ϕ,A) = cos2(δ/2), p(ϕ,¬A) = sin2(δ/2).
This means that the relative frequency of photons arriving at the detector DA1
is approximately cos2(δ/2) and the relative frequency of arriving at the detector
DA2 is approximately sin2(δ/2).
This is the usual quantum mechanical description of the above experiment. It
makes use of the fact that the calculable probabilities, e.g. p(ϕ,A), are repro-
duced in the relative frequencies of the measurement results, however, it does
not explain it. At ﬁrst it is only certain that the observables A and B are not
objective in the state ϕ and that the measurement result of these quantities is
completely undetermined for any individual measurement. If for example a re-
peatable measurement with an appropriate interaction operator UA is carried out
at the system S prepared in state ϕ, then the state of the system S after the
premeasurement, i.e., after switching oﬀ the measurement interaction, is given by
the mixed state
Ws(ϕ,A) = p(ϕ,A)P [ϕ(A)] + p(ϕ,¬A)P [ϕ(¬A)].
Now, the orthodox interpretation claims without giving any reason that the co-
eﬃcients p(ϕ,Ai) are the relative frequencies of the measurement results Ai in a
large collective of measurements.
However, this claim does not state a new law of probability but a provable the-
orem. In order to see this, let us consider a large number N of independent,
identically prepared systems S with preparation ϕi to be a compound system SN
in the product state
(ϕ)N = ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2 ⊗ ...⊗ ϕN .
A premeasurement of A transforms the state ϕi of every individual system in a
mixed state
W i = p(ϕi, A)P [ϕi(A)] + p(ϕi,¬A)P [ϕi(¬A)].
If A is measured for all of the N systems Si, then after the premeasurements the
individual systems are in mixed states W i, and thus the compound system SN is
in the product state (W )N = W 1 ⊗ ...⊗WN .
Now, in the Hilbert spaceHN of the compound system SN an operator fNk relative
frequency of systems with the property Ak may be constructed, the eigenvalues of
which are the relative frequencies of the values Ak within the compound system.4
It is easy to see that the expectation value of the operator fNk in the product state
(W )N is given by (ϕ,Ak). But (W )N is no eigenstate of the operator fNk with
eigenvalue p(ϕ,Ak); that is,
TNk := tr{(W )N(fNk − p(ϕ,Ak))2} 6= 0.
4For details see Mittelstaedt (1998), pp. 47 and Mittelstaedt/Weingartner (2005), chapter
12.
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Hence, the relative frequencies of the measurement results Ak are no objective
properties of SN in state (W )N . However, after a lengthy calculation one ﬁnds
that
TNk = p(ϕ,Ak)(1− p(ϕ,Ak))/N.
Therefore, in the limit N →∞ the state (W )N becomes an eigenstate of fNk and
the compound system SN possesses the relative frequency p(ϕ,Ak) of Ak as an
objective property.
In quantum mechanics the following facts are thus to be recognized. The mea-
surement of a quantity that is undetermined in the preparation state of a system
gives rise to a measurement result which is by no law determined. Now, by means
of mere formal considerations from this follows that in a suﬃciently large ensem-
ble of equal measurements the relative frequencies of the measurement results are
already determined by the preparation of the object systems and the measured
observable.  Strangely enough, however, this is exactly what Einstein wanted.
He did not admit that physics is based on independent statistical laws. Instead,
he was more ready to accept complete lawlessness. In quantum mechanics the
individual measurements are not subject to a law and the probabilistic laws stem
from this only due to statistical considerations and the large number of objects.
Therefore, the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics are not independent, but,
on the statistical level, they reﬂect the fact that the individual systems are not de-
termined by any law.  Unfortunately, nobody was able to explain this situation
to Einstein at the time when he expressed his thoughts.
4 Is Quantum Mechanics Complete? The EPR Argument
The third objection of Einstein's against quantum mechanics which is discussed
up to the present day claims that quantum mechanics is incomplete. It was pub-
lished by Einstein together with Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 and will be called
the EPR argument here (Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen 1935). In his debate with
Bohr (see Bohr 1949) Einstein had to admit that in general the direct experimen-
tal access to a certain observable is impossible. For several thought experiments
suggested by Einstein Bohr was able to demonstrate that the uncertainty relation
can not be circumvented.  But Einstein pursued also Heisenberg's thesis of an
allegedly unavoidable uncontrollable disturbance of the object system.5 Einstein
took both points of view into account when he formulated his principle of reality
mentioned above, which is the ﬁrst step of the argument in the EPR article of
1935. This principle of reality R was:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding
to this physical quantity.
5In 1952 Einstein still writes in a letter to Besso: [...] indeed every measurement signiﬁes
an uncontrollable real intervention in the system (Heisenberg) (quoted from Stachel 2002, p.
390).
Physics and Philosophy  2006  Id: 001 9
Peter Mittelstaedt: Einstein's Objections against Quantum Mechanics
The second argument is less explicitly used. It is a principle of locality that derives
from the idea of a local, causally determined relativistic ﬁeld. The principle of
locality L may e.g. be expressed as follows:6
If two systems can not interact with each other, then a measurement
of one system can not change the state of the other system.
Based on the principles of reality R and locality L, the EPR article now attempts
to show that quantum mechanics is incomplete. The argument makes use of a
thought experiment which was later simpliﬁed by Bohm and Aharonov (Bohm/
Aharonov 1957). In order to understand it, let us consider two spin 1/2 particles
S1 and S2 (e.g., proton and neutron) prepared in a 1S0 state Ψ(S1 + S2) (with
the total spin 0), however, which do no longer interact. If a measurement of the
spin σ1(n) in direction n (with eigenstates ϕ
(1)
n , ϕ
(1)
-n) of the system S1 results in
the value s1 = +1/2, then in a subsequent measurement of the spin σ2(n) (with
eigenstates ϕ(2)n , ϕ
(2)
-n) of the system S2 in the same direction one with certainty
obtains the value s2 = −1/2. If the spin measurement at S2 is carried out in
in another direction n' 6= n, then for σ(n') the measurement outcome −1/2
can no longer predicted with certainty, but only with the probability p(n, -n') =
1/2(1 + n · n′).
In order to show by means of this thought experiment that quantum mechanics
is incomplete, we have to take into account that from a logical point of view both
principles we presupposed are implications. Accordingly, we write
R = R1 → R2, L = L1 → L2.
When both partial systems have a suﬃciently large distance of each other they
can no longer interact. Then, the premiss L1 of L is satisﬁed and hence also L2.
Therefore, a measurement of σ1(n) at S1 can not change S2. Since furthermore
the outcome s1 of a σ1(n)-measurement determines the value s2 = −s1 of the
observable σ2(n), the premiss R1 of R is satisﬁed. Hence, R2 holds, too; that is,
the value s2 von σ2(n) is an objective property of the system S2 with preparation
Ψ. Because this argument may be applied to the spin observables σ1(n) and
σ2(n) for any direction n, it has to be concluded that the value s2 of σ2(n) for
any direction n objectively exists in the system S2 after preparing the state Ψ.
Hence, one the one hand the value s2 of σ2(n) in S2 is objectively determined,
even if the observer subjectively does not know it. However, on the other hand
quantum mechanics does not permit to determine this value but only its proba-
bility from the preparation state Ψ(S1 + S2). Therefore, quantum mechanics is
not complete. The scheme given in Fig. 3 summarizes this result.
When this result was published, it met a storm of protest from the physicists. For
example Pauli was obviously very agitated when he wrote to Heisenberg (Pauli
1985a, pp. 402):
6Related to a concrete instance, Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen (1935), 779 put it as follows:
since at the time of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take
place in the second system in consequence of anything that may be done to the ﬁrst system.
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Separation of S1, S2 // L1
(L)
// L2

preparationΨ(S) //
OO

correlation // R1
(R)

probability // incompleteness R2oo
Figure 3: The EPR Argument for Incompleteness.
Einstein hat sich wieder einmal zur Quantenmechanik öﬀentlich geäußert,
[...] bekanntlich ist das jedes Mal eine Katastrophe, wenn das geschieht.
And furthermore:
Immerhin möchte ich ihm zugestehen, dass ich, wenn mir ein Student
in jüngeren Semestern solche Einwände machen würde, diesen für ganz
intelligent und hoﬀnungsvoll halten würde.
And ﬁnally:
Überhaupt spukt bei älteren Herren wie Laue und Einstein die Idee
herum, die Quantenmechanik sei zwar richtig, aber unvollständig.
Man könnte sie durch in ihr nicht enthaltene Aussagen ergänzen [...]
And then Pauli attempts to persuade Heisenberg in this letter to write a peda-
gogical reply":
Vielleicht könntest Du [...] einmal in autoritativer Weise klarstellen,
dass eine solche Ergänzung der Quantenmechanik nicht möglich ist,
ohne ihren Inhalt abzuändern.
Even though Heisenberg wrote the draft of such a reply, he never published it,
presumably for good reasons.
Countless letters to Einstein and the publications of many authors tried to refute
the EPR argument in order to protect quantum mechanics from the stigma of in-
completeness. Einstein himself was quite amused that all the writings he received
immediately after publication of the EPR article expressed absolute certainty that
his arguments were wrong, but all of them gave diﬀerent reasons (Jammer 1974, p.
187). However, all the critics (and Einstein himself, too) overlooked a little detail
in the EPR argument that might have contributed to bringing the controversy to
an end on objective grounds.
In order to see this, let us reconsider the last step of the argument that led from R2
to incompleteness. R2 states that for every n the system S2 has an objective value
s2 = {+1/2,−1/2} of σ2(n), with probability 1/2. Hence, the partial system S2
is in a mixed state W2(S2) = 1/2P [ϕ
(2)
n ] + 1/2P [ϕ
(2)
-n] admitting of an ignorance
interpretation, i.e., in a proper mixture. This means that the observable 1⊗σ2
Physics and Philosophy  2006  Id: 001 11
Peter Mittelstaedt: Einstein's Objections against Quantum Mechanics
related to S1 + S2 may also be objectiﬁed in the compound system S1 + S2 with
preparation Ψ, where S1 + S2 is in the mixed state
WΨ(S1 + S2) = 1/2P [ϕ
(1)
n ⊗ ϕ(2)-n] + 1/2P [ϕ(1)-n]⊗ ϕ(2)n ].
Therefore, for a calculation of the expectation values of the compound system
the states Ψ and WΨ are equivalent. This claim may easily be checked. For the
speciﬁc test observable
B(n',n) := σ1(n')⊗ σ2(n") = ΣikBikPik(n',n)
with
Pik(n',n) := P [ϕ
(1)
in' ⊗ ϕ
(2)
kn ] i, k ∈ {+,−},
the expectation values with regard to Ψ and WΨ must be identical,
tr{P [Ψ]Pik (n',n)} = tr{WΨ · Pik (n',n)}.
After a short calculation, from this derives
n' · n − (n · n')(n · n) = 0 (VO)
as the condition for value objectivation (VO) of σ1 and σ2. Except for some very
speciﬁc triples (n, n' n"), this equation is violated in quantum mechanics. Hence,
the EPR argument does not result in the incompleteness of quantum mechanics,
but in a contradiction. An elementary calculation shows that Bell's inequalities
(BELL), which contradict to quantum mechanics for appropriate triples of values,
derive from (OV):
| n' · n− n |≤ n · (n− n); | n' · n+ n |≤ n · (n+ n) (BELL)
Separation of S1, S2 // L1
(L)
// L2

preparationΨ(S) //
OO

correlation // R1
(R)

probability −→ 6↙ (V O), (BELL)oo R2oo
Figure 4: The EPR Argument Gives Rise to a Contradiction.
It is obvious that without knowing Bell's inequalities nobody could refute the
EPR argument by good reasons. But Bell's inequalities were only discovered in
1964, that is, almost 30 years after the EPR paper and 10 years after Einstein's
dead in 1955. Bell clearly recognized that the incompleteness thesis concerning
quantum mechanics can only be refuted by a NO GO theorem for additional
hidden parameters (Bell (1964), p. 195):
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[...] additional variables were to restore to the theory causality and
locality. In this note that idea will be formulated mathematically and
shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics.
Today, Bell's original proof for this suspicion may be presented in the strongly
simpliﬁed version given above.
Of course the contradiction revealed by these considerations must be eliminated.
Whereas in the years after 1935 primarily the principle of reality was at stake,
now it became clear that the principle of locality must be abandoned. Due to
this insight, the fundamental non-locality of quantum mechanics entered into
the physicists' general consciousness. Furthermore, the non-locality of quantum
mechanics was convincingly conﬁrmed since the 1980s up to the present day by
a tremendous number of experiments that were increasingly improved.7
However, all this was unknown when the EPR argument was published in 1935.
Therefore, at that time nobody was able to put forward any convincing counter-
arguments against Einstein. Therefore, the objections against EPR were made of
lumpy arguments and philosophical conjectures such as the assumption that the
principle of reality is untenable in quantum mechanics. Einstein's ironic remark
that the authors of all letters to him were convinced that the EPR argument is
wrong, by giving all completely diﬀerent reasons for this, is deﬁnitely due to the
lack of argument of his opponents.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the years between 1925 and 1955, Einstein again and again put forward argu-
ments against quantum mechanics because he had the impression that this theory
does not suﬃciently refer to reality; that it is based on probabilistic laws; and
that it is therefore incomplete, even though not wrong. Einstein must obtained
this impression from the presentations of quantum mechanics in the ﬁrst decade
after its discovery, since they considered a positivistic interpretation of the theory
to be unavoidable8 and the unresolvable connection of object and subject in what
Bohr called a phenomenon to be essential for any understanding of quantum
mechanics.
Hence, Einstein's objections against quantum mechanics are not directed against
the theory, as we know and understand it today, but against an interpretational
phantom that emerged from several mystiﬁcations in the early years of quan-
tum mechanics. Concerning them, Einstein's objections were absolutely justiﬁed.
However, at the time when Einstein made these objections it was impossible to
refute them for good reasons, because the formal tools needed for doing so were
not yet available. But these technical deﬁciencies were not recognized by the
advocates of the quantum physics of these days; and this is why many of them
7Here, I think of the experiments from Aspect (1982) up to Zeilinger et al. (see Weihs et al.
1998).
8See Heisenberg (1969), pp. 91100.
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thought to be able to refute Einstein by lumpy arguments. The refutation cam-
paign against the EPR argument clearly illustrates this observation.
The principle of reality formulated by Einstein is satisﬁed in quantum mechanics,
even though neither Einstein nor his opponents were able to recognize this. His
criticism of the probabilistic structure of the theory is irrelevant, too, since just
his ideas about chaos and lawfulness in quantum mechanics are realized. But
this could also not be known by anybody in Einstein's days. Only the reproach
of incompleteness is objectively wrong. However, an adequate refutation became
only possible 30 years later.
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